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Settlement Delays 
and Stock Prices 
by Ramon  P. DeGennaro 
The typical stockbroker requires only about two 
minutes to execute and confirm a market order. 
During that time, the order is routed electroni- 
cally either to the specialist or to the Intermarket 
Trading System, which connects eight regional 
markets including the New York Stock Exchange 
and the National Association of Securities Deal- 
ers. These agents then pair the order with another 
buy or sell order.'  Thanks to modern technol- 
ogy, the process of executing a trade and pro- 
ducing a confirmed order is quick and efficient. 
Although this confirmed order represents a 
binding contract between the buyer and seller, 
neither the security nor payment for the security 
changes hands at the time the trade is con- 
firmed. Instead, payment for the stock occurs five 
business days later, when the buyer delivers a 
bank check to the seller and the seller delivers 
the promised se~urities.~  Until final payment is 
made, the stock trade remains conditional, and 
1  For a further discussion of  trading details, see Jakus and Chandy (1989). 
2  In practice, these transactions usually are executed by brokers acting 
as agents. 
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official title remains with the seller, who cannot 
use the proceeds of the sale. 
The equity markets have no provision to com- 
pensate the seller for the opportunity cost he 
bears while waiting for the trade to clear. In con- 
trast, bond-market procedures call for explicit 
adjustment of the cost of the bond for interest 
accrued since the most recent coupon date. 
Interest is calculated using the number of days 
from the last coupon payment until the date of 
delivery, not the date of the trade. If the terms of 
the trade call for delivery tomorrow instead of 
today, the buyer must pay an extra day's worth of 
interest. Another important market, residential 
real estate, while not explicitly adjusting the pur- 
chase price for the date of closing, does prorate 
taxes and rents for the date of occupancy. 
Although the stock markets make no  explicit 
adjustment for the opportunity cost of settlement 
delays, rational investors do  not ignore the fact 
that they lose several days' worth of interest. 
Indeed, much empirical work has assumed that 
investors consider delivery procedures in pricing 
assets, although few studies have tested this 
theory. 
This paper studies whether investors do, in 
fact, consider settlement delays in determining 
stock prices. We construct two models of stock 
http://clevelandfed.org/research/review/
1989 Q 4
Best available copyreturns. The first expresses returns as a function 
of changes in the settlement delay. The second 
models returns as a function of changes in the 
length of the delay and in the federal funds rates 
during the delay. The first model controls for 
variation in the length of the delay, while the 
second controls for both the opportunity cost and 
the length of the delay. We then conduct regres- 
sion tests of the significance of these variables. 
Both models show that in the full sample and all 
subperiods, investors apparently do consider the 
settlement delay; the variables controlling for it 
are statistically significant and correctly signed. 
Section I reviews previous research regarding 
payment delays, and section I1 develops our 
model of the return-generating process. In sec- 
tion 111 we describe the data, conduct prelimi- 
nary tests, and report the results. A summary 
concludes the paper. 
I. Previous Research and 
Ihe  Impact of  Delivery 
Procedures 
Lakonishok and Levi (1982) speculate that set- 
tlement and check-clearing delays might explain 
the "weekend effect" in stock prices. The week- 
end effect refers to the well-documented ten- 
dency of stock prices to decline on Monday.3 
Iakonishok and Levi note that, in addition to the 
settlement delay, the check presented at settle- 
ment requires another business day to clear. They 
claim this makes the total payment delay six bus- 
iness days. For their empirical work, they add 
and subtract interest based on the prime rate, 
but, more important for our purposes, they con- 
duct no tests to determine if  buyers actually do 
compensate sellers in the manner they suggest. 
DeGennaro (1990, forthcoming) tests the con- 
jecture that the combined settlement and check- 
clearing delays explain the weekend effect. He 
concludes that, while the combined delay fails to 
explain the weekly return pattern, it does appear 
to influence measured stock returns. However, 
he also reports that the estimated rate of com- 
pensation for the combined delay varies substan- 
tially, suggesting that further work is necessary. 
3  The  weekend effect was first identified by Cross (1973). An important 
paper by French (1980) reexamined this apparent anomaly, demonstrating that 
returns on Monday are so persistently negative that rational investors must 
expect  to suffer losses on Mondays. Lakonishok and Smidt (1988) extend the 
evidence of  negative Monday returns to a 90-year sample. Gibbons and Hess 
(1981) show that Treasury bills also earn below-average returns on  Mondays, 
although returns are not negative for bills. 
Another example is Choi and Strong (1983), 
who study "when-issued common stock. Firms 
announce stock issues well in advance of the 
time the new securities are issued; investors 
trade these securities on a "when-issued basis. 
Choi and Strong attempt to determine why this 
when-issued stock commands a premium over 
the corresponding stock that is currently out- 
standing. They speculate that when-issued stock 
represents the existing share plus a zero-interest 
loan. They find that adjusting prices for the 
interest savings is insufficient  to explain the dis- 
crepancy, but again, they do not test to see if 
investors price the zero-interest loan. 
More recently, Flannery and Protopapadakis 
(1988) assume that settlement and clearing 
delays are priced in their test of the generality of 
the weekend effect. They study three stock 
indexes and seven Treasury bond maturities to 
learn if  intraweek seasonality is the same across 
these assets. Following the suggestion of Lakoni- 
shok and Levi, they adjust the returns on the 10 
assets to control for the financing costs incurred 
during the payment delays. They find that the 
returns on these assets do not vary in a similar 
manner during the week, but again, the authors 
do  not test if  the delay is actually priced. 
DeGennaro (1988) shows such payment 
?lelays can have important implications for inter- 
est rates. If  delays exist in the Treasury bill 
market, but are not explicitly incorporated into 
pricing equations, certain common estimators of 
term premiums are biased in favor of finding 
positive premiums. He shows that this bias is 
sufficiently large to explain the results of McCul- 
loch (1975). However, he does not test if  inves- 
tors do, indeed, consider these delays. 
The results of the present paper are important 
for several reasons. First, if the delays have no 
impact on observed prices, then the aforemen- 
tioned studies must be flawed: theoretical work 
begins with inappropriate assumptions, and 
empirical studies are misspecified. Second, if 
investors do  consider settlement delays in deter- 
mining equity prices, then observed prices 
diverge from true prices. This has implications 
for the event-study methodology commonly used 
in empirical tests (see, for example, Hite and 
Owers [I9831  ).  To conduct an event study, the 
researcher first estimates the parameters of a 
model using time-series data prior to the event 
in question. He then calculates abnormal returns, 
defined as realized returns less the returns pre- 
dicted by the model. Significance tests can be 
conducted using the cumulative sum of these 
residuals. 
To date, all event studies known to the author 
have ignored the possibility that payment delays 
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return. If  these delays do  affect stock prices, 
events that may seem to be economically signifi- 
cant may in fact be negligible once proper 
accounting for the delays is made. Conversely, 
events judged to be insignificant may be 
important. 
Consider, for example, an event that the 
researcher expects to generate positive returns, 
but which in fact does not. The total compensa- 
tion for the settlement delay, capitalized in the 
observed price, may be higher than usual on the 
event date (due to a holiday that lengthens the 
delay, or perhaps simply to an increase in interest 
rates). This would make the observed price 
higher than usual, biasing the significance of test 
statistics. The reverse might also be true. The 
economic effect of an event may be positive and 
significant, but if  the number of calendar days in 
the delay is lower than usual, or if  the opportunity 
cost on a daily basis is less, then the impact of a 
true economic event might be negated and 
appear insignificant. 
Other important results might also be affected. 
For example, French and Roll (1986) document 
a large decrease in volatility when markets are 
closed. The variance of stock returns from Friday's 
close to Monday's close is only about 10 or 15 
percent higher than during a one-day holding 
period. If  the opportunity cost of the settlement 
delay varies systematically-for example, if  inter- 
est rates or the delay varies according to the day 
of the week-French and Roll's variance ratio 
measures both the true volatility and the variance 
in the opportunity cost. While this is unlikely to 
be sufficient to overturn their results, divergences 
from true prices are especially important in stud- 
ies of variance, which is a particularly sensitive 
measure due to the squaring of deviations from 
the mean. 
Perhaps the most important reason for studying 
whether delivery procedures are important and 
whether settlement delays are priced is their 
implication for market efficiency. If the settle- 
ment delay does not affect prices, then research- 
ers must not only reinterpret research that pre- 
sumes it does, but they must also explain why 
rational investors ignore the fact that the present 
value of the purchase price is reduced because 
of these delays. 
The choice of delivery procedures may become 
an increasingly important policy issue for the 
securities industry. For example, the present five- 
day delivery terms trace to the inability of tech- 
nology to handle heavy trading volume during 
the late 1960s. Prior to February 9, 1968, the set- 
tlement period was only four business days; 
extending it to five ensures that brokers have a 
weekend between the trade date and the delivery 
date to complete the necessary paperwork. Con- 
ceivably, further increases in volume could force 
another extension, while techno10'~ical  advances 
might permit a reduction. 
A reduction in the time between the trade 
date and the delivery date may be important in 
preventing defaults on trades. For example, 
although the buyer and seller commit to trade at 
the confirmation of their order, large price 
changes create incentives for one side of the 
transaction to renege. For example, equity pur- 
chasers during the week of October 12, 1987, 
expected to receive stock worth a given amount; 
instead, they received stock worth about 20 per- 
cent less. Although the safeguards against such 
defaults proved adequate in this case, the 
increasing volatility of financial markets observed 
in recent years means larger losses can be sus- 
tained between the time of the trade and the 
date that the trade becomes final, increasing the 
likelihood that the buyer will default. 
II.  The Model 
If  investors consider delivery procedures in pric- 
ing stocks, then observed prices contain the true 
value of the underlying asset plus an adjustment 
for the settlement delay. Observed prices mis- 
state true values. Since empirical work must use 
observed prices, we must devise a model that 
removes any adjustment the market incorporates 
for the delay. To do this, we first define the true 
stock price, P*,  as the price observed in the 
absence of delays. The expected true price at 
time t as a function of the true price at the 
beginning of the holding period (time t - 1) is 
where El - ,  is the expectations operator condi- 
tioned on information available at time t - 1, 
P :  is the unobservable true price at time t , 
E (R *) is the unobservable (constant) expected 
continuously compounded daily rate of return 
on the stock in the absence of delays, dl is the 
dividend yield, and eq  is the base for natural 
logarithms. Equation (1) states that if no divi- 
dends are expected to be paid, the expected 
price at t is the price at t - 1 adjusted for the 
expected continuously compounded rate of 
price appreciation. If  dividends are expected to 
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observed price P  is written as 
st 
(2)  p,=p?eq(Ccj,), 
j=  1 
where st is the number of days in the settlement 
delay and cj,  is the continuously compounded 
rate of compensation on day j for trades made at 
t.  If  investors ignore delivery procedures, c 
equals zero and the true price equals the 
observed price. If  sellers demand and receive 
compensation for the settlement delay, c is posi- 
st 
tive. In equation (2),  C cj, represents the total 
j=  1 
compensation to the seller for financing the 
position until he receives the proceeds of the 
sale at settlement. 
Equation (2)  is also true at t - 1, so 
Solving equations (2)  and (3) for P *, substitut- 
ing into equation (I),  and assuming that the P 
and c  are uncorrelated, we can rearrange equa- 
tion (  l)  to obtain 
Letting c be constant and defining As, as the 
change in s  at time t, we obtain 
where the total expected return on the stock- 
capital gains plus dividends-is written as R, . 
Intuitively, equation (5) says the observed 
expected return equals the expected return in 
the absence of delays plus changes in the impact 
of delays. 
To proxy for the dependent variable R, , we 
use the return on the value-weighted portfolio, 
including dividends, provided by the Center for 
Research in Security Prices (CRSP). Although we 
have derived our model in terms of an individ- 
ual stock, if  the settlement delay affects any 
stock, it must affect all stocks. Further, this effect 
is not diversifiable:  any settlement effects must 
appear in the observed return on a portfolio. 
Substituting ex post values, we obtain our test 
equation: 
(6)  R,= bo+  b,As,+ e,. 
In this model, b, estimates the unobservable 
expected continuously compounded daily rate of 
return on the stock in the absence of delays, and 
b, estimates c,  the rate sellers receive as 
compensation for the settlement delay. Theory 
suggests that both coefficients should be posi- 
tive. This is because risk-averse investors require 
a premium to  compensate for the nondiversifiable 
risk contained in stocks, and increases in the 
financing costs during the settlement delay 
require buyers to raise their bids to compensate 
the sellers. Therefore, one-tailed tests are 
appropriate. 
One potential problem with this specification 
is that As varies relatively little. To circumvent 
this, we also estimate a second specification. 
Rather than letting the settlement cost per day 
(c  ) be constant in equation (4),  we use the 
federal funds rate as a proxy for c.  The federal 
funds rate is both readily available and respon- 
sive to changes in the economic environment. 
Formally, we write 
where f,,  is the federal funds rate on day j of the 
settlement delay for trades at t, and y  is a 
constant. For notational convenience, we define 
st  st 
C S, as Cf,,  , so that y X Z  S, = 2  cj,  . Substi- 
J=  1  j=  1 
tuting C s into equation (4)  and combining 
terms yields 
where ACS, is the change in CS  at t, and the 
total expected return on the stock is again writ- 
ten as R, . Substituting ex post values, we obtain 
As in equation (6),  b; estimates the unobserv- 
able expected continuously compounded daily 
rate of return on the stock in the absence of 
delays, but in this model, b; estimates y,  the 
proportion of the federal funds rate sellers 
receive as compensation for the settlement 
delay. One-tailed tests are again appropriate. 
Equation (9)  offers both advantages and dis- 
advantages relative to equation (6).  In equation 
(9),  the independent variable is a function of the 
federal funds rate, and therefore may be simul- 
taneously determined with the stock return. 
However, it controls for both the length of the 
settlement delay and the opportunity cost during 
that delay rather than for simply the number of 
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Equation (lo),  Full Sample 
Estimates obtained by regressing the rate of return on the 
CRSP value-weighted index, including dividends (R,),  on the 
change in the settlement delay (As,),  corrected for 
heteroscedasticity: 
(10)  Rt=bo+b,As,+ut, 
Full sample period: January 1, 1970-December 3  1, 1986 
(4,296 observations) 
Variable  Parameter estimate (t-statistic) 
60  4.68  x 
(3.031" 
61  7.27 x 
(4.07)" 
a. Significant at the 1 percent level. 
NOTE: Significance levels are for one-tailed tests on b,,  and b,. 
SOURCE: Author's computations. 
days in the delay. It is also much more variable 
than As in equation (6). 
Which economic or institutional forces could 
cause the slope coefficients in equations (6)  and 
(9)  to be not significantly different from zero? 
First, s, is the promised settlement delay. 
Although the exchanges alter st only rarely, 
brokerage firms may not credit and debit 
accounts as accurately as the exchanges. For 
example, they may err and credit a customer's 
account later than promised. Such mistakes may 
not always be discovered. Even if  the customer 
does detect the error, he must take the time to 
complain. Investors may, therefore, base com- 
pensation on the expected value of the delay 
rather than on the promised delay. If  so, the 
independent variables in equations (6)  and (9) 
are incorrect proxies for the true values, and the 
estimated coefficients could be insignificant. 
In addition, some investors face different 
values of st because of the procedures of their 
agents. For example, some brokers debit 
accounts for purchases on the trade date, but 
credit accounts for purchases only on delivery. 
This asymmetric treatment permits the brokerage 
firm to use the funds between the two dates. The 
firm generates revenue by imposing an added 
cost of trading on its customers. If these inves- 
tors are the marginal traders, neither As, nor 
ACS, measures the true cost of the delays these 
investors face. Again, the estimated slope coeff- 
cients could be insignificant. 
Ill.  Data  and Results 
Data 
The stock-return measure is the return on the 
CRSP value-weighted index, with dividends. We 
use 4,296 observations from January 1, 1970, 
through December 31, 1986. Federal funds rates 
used to compute the opportunity cost of the set- 
tlement delay are from the Federal Reserve 
Board. We estimate equation (6)  in the full Sam- 
ple and in three subperiods partitioned at 
October 6,  1979 and October 9,  1982, the dates 
of important changes in the Federal Reserve's 
operating procedures. On the former date, the 
central bank began focusing on the level of 
nonborrowed reserves rather than on the level of 
the federal funds rate. On the latter date, it began 
attempting to stabilize interest rates. 
Preliminary Tests 
The ordinary least squares residuals from equa- 
tion (6)  exhibit positive first-order serial correla- 
tion, while higher-order autocorrelations are 
small. This is consistent with the use of an index 
as the dependent variable and with the results of 
Scholes and Williams (1977).  To see this intui- 
tively, note that some securities composing the 
index do not trade at the closing bell. The most 
recent prices for these securities are "stale." If 
the market moves up or down since the last 
trade, these stale prices tend to move in the 
same direction when the securities subsequently 
do  trade, inducing serial correlation at lag one. 
Therefore, we fit a first-order moving average to 
equation (6)  and estimate 
U,  = e, - Be, - , . 
To formally investigate the possibility that the 
parameters in equation (10)  may not be stable 
across subperiods, we conduct the test according 
to Chow (1960)  for each subperiod partition. 
These tests show that both break points are 
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Equation  (1  0). Subperiods 
Estimates obtained by regressing the rate of return on the 
CRSP value-weighted index, including dividends (R,),  on the 
change in the settlement delay (As,),  corrected for 
heteroscedasticity: 
(10)  R,= bo  + blast+  u,, 
First sample period:  January 1, 1970 - October 6,  1979 
(2,467 observations) 
Variable  Parameter estimate (t-statistic) 
60  3.10  x 
(1.47)" 
b~  7.20 x 
(3.43)b 
Second sample period:  October 7, 1979 - October 8, 1982 
(760 observations) 
Variable  Parameter estimate (t-statistic) 
6,  5.60  x 
Third sample period: October 9, 1982 - December 31, 1986 
(  1,069 observations) 
Variable  Parameter estimate (t-statistic) 
b  o  7.61 x 
(2.92Ib 
b,  5.98  x 
(1.60)a 
8  0.10 
(3.42Ib 
a. Significant at the 10 percent level. 
b.  Significant at the 1 percent level. 
c. Significant at the 5 percent level. 
NOTE: Significance levels are for one-tailed tests on bo and 6,. 
SOURCE: Author's computations. 
necessary. For the first partition, the F  -value is 
7.64, which exceeds the 1 percent critical value 
of 3.78. For the second, the F  -value is 5.59, 
which again is significant at the 1 percent level. 
In addition, the test rejects the conjecture that 
the first and third subsamples can be combined. 
Because of weekends and holidays, holding 
periods range from one to four days. Given the 
results of French and Roll (1986),  we would 
expect heteroscedasticity to be present, depend- 
ing on the holding period for the observations. 
This proves to be the case. In the full sample, for 
example, the F  -ratio using the variance of the 
three-day holding period and the one-day hold- 
ing period is 1.31, which exceeds the critical 1 
percent value of 1.15. Similar results are found 
for both subperiods. Therefore, we weight 
observations by the inverse standard deviation of 
the residuals for the holding period in all 
reported results. 
Results Using the Change 
in the Length of  the Delay 
Table 1 contains the results obtained by estimat- 
ing equation (10)  using the full sample. Given 
the results of the Chow tests reported above, 
these estimates must be interpreted with caution, 
but we report them for completeness. All 
parameters have their expected signs and are sta- 
tistically significant. The intercept, which esti- 
mates the expected daily stock return in the 
absence of delays, implies an annual rate of 
about 11.80 percent. This is quite close to the 
actual realized value of 10.97 percent. The 
parameter b, estimates c,  the rate of compensa- 
tion for the settlement delay. This parameter is 
also significant, with a t -statistic of 4.07. 
Table 2 contains the results from the subperi- 
ods, which are broadly consistent with the full 
sample. For the first subperiod, the intercept is 
positive and significant at the 10  percent level, 
and is almost exactly the correct magnitude. The 
estimated value of .000310 implies an annual 
rate of about 7.81 percent; the actual value was 
7.13 percent. The estimate of b, is reliably dif- 
ferent from zero, with a t -ratio of 3.43. 
After the first change in Federal Reserve oper- 
ating policy, the results are somewhat different. 
The intercept is still marginally significant and 
again about the correct size (it implies a daily 
rate of 14.10 percent versus the actua1.12.08 per- 
cent). Despite being larger in magnitude, how- 
ever, the significance of the slope coefficient is 
smaller. The t -ratio is 1.76. The larger standard 
error is consistent with the smaller sample size 
and with the increased volatility during this 
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Equation [ll),  Full Sample 
Estimates obtained by regressing the rate of return on the 
CRSP value-weighted index, including dividends (R,),  on the 
change in total return from an investment in federal funds 
during the settlement delay (ACS,),  corrected for 
heteroscedasticitv: 
Full sample period: January 1, 1970-  December 3  1, 1986 
(4,296 observations) 
Variable  Parameter estimate (t-statistic) 
bb  4.69 x 
(3.03)" 
p~-p~pp  pp  - 
a. Significant at the 1 percent level. 
NOTE: Significance levels are for one-tailed tests on bh  and 6;. 
SOURCE: Author's computations. 
period, when the Federal Reserve did not 
attempt to stabilize interest rates. 
The third sample begins on October 9, 1982. 
The results of this subsample are similar to those 
of the second subsample. The estimate of 
b,  implies a stock return of 19.17 percent; the 
actual value was 19.07 percent. The t -value of 
2.92 is significant at the 1 percent level. The 
estimated slope coefficient is 0.000598,  which 
differs from zero at the 10  percent level. 
Results Using the  Change 
in the Opportunity Cost 
During the Delay 
The preliminary tests using equation (9)  yield 
results similar to those of equation (6).  Chow 
tests confirm that the subperiods are best esti- 
mated separately. Heteroscedasticity is again 
present, and a first-order moving average is 
required. We estimate 
For completeness, table 3 contains the results 
obtained by estimating equation (11)  using the 
full sample. Again, all parameters have their 
expected signs and are statistically significant. 
The intercept, which estimates the expected 
daily stock return in the absence of delays, is 
very close to the value in table 1. The parameter 
b ; estimates y, the proportion of the federal 
funds rate that buyers receive as compensation 
for the settlement delay. This parameter is also 
significant, with a t -statistic of 4.02. The coefi- 
cient of 2.73 is also reliably different from unity. 
A t -ratio testing the hypothesis that the esti- 
mated value equals one is 2.55, which rejects the 
null hypothesis at the 1 percent level. Thus, we 
reject the conjecture that the rate of compensa- 
tion is the federal funds rate. The federal funds 
rate is too low or too stable to serve as the rate 
of compensation. 
Table 4 contains the estimates from the sub- 
periods, which are again similar to those from 
equation (10).  For the first subperiod, the inter- 
cept is the same size and is equally significant as 
in table 2. The estimate of the slope coefficient, 
b ;,  is 3.80. As is the case for the full sample, this 
is reliably different both from zero and from 
unity. The t -ratios are 3.64 and 2.69, respectively. 
After the first change in Federal Reserve oper- 
ating policy, the intercept is still significant and 
again about the correct size, but the slope coeffi- 
cient is much smaller. The estimated value is 
1.84. This differs from zero at the 10 percent 
level, but unlike the case in the first subsample, 
it does not differ from unity. The t -statistic is 
only 0.71. We cannot reject the hypothesis that 
the rate of compensation for settlement delays 
equals the average realized federal funds rate 
during the sample. 
The third sample begins on October 9, 1982. 
The results are similar to the second subsample 
and comparable to equation (10).  The estimate 
of b ,!, is significant and implies a stock return of 
19.18 percent, compared to the actual value of 
19.07 percent. The estimated slope coefficient, 
b ;  , is 2.59, which differs from zero at the 5 per- 
cent level, but does not differ from unity. The 
t -statistic is only 1.03. 
The results suggest that during the first sample, 
the Federal Reserve's intervention in the federal 
funds market prevented the federal funds rate 
from tracking market conditions as well as it did 
during periods when the Federal Reserve concen- 
trated on other policy vehicles. When the federal 
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Regression Results 
Equation (1  11, Subperiods 
Estimates obtained by regressing the rate of return on the 
CRSP value-weighted index, including dividends (R,),  on the 
change in total return from an investment in federal funds 
during the settlement delay (ACS,), corrected for 
heteroscedasticitv: 
First sample period: January 1, 1970 - October 6, 1979 
(2,467 observations) 
Variable  Parameter estimate (t-statistic) 
b:  3.10 x 
Second sample period: October 7, 1979 - October 8, 1982 
(760 observations) 
Variable  Parameter estimate (t-statistic) 
4  5.62 x 
(1.41)a 
4  1.84 
(1.55Ia 
Third sample period: October 9, 1982 - December 31,1986 
(  1,069 observations) 
Variable  Parameter estimate (t-statistic) 
&I  7.61 x 
(2.92Ib 
4  2.59 
(1.68)' 
reject the notion that stock purchasers compen- 
sate sellers for the settlement delay at the federal 
funds rate. However, when the central bank 
intervenes, the federal funds rate appears to be 
too stable to serve as the rate of compensation. 
Since the estimates of b ;  exceed unity, they 
are higher than predicted by Iakonishok and 
Levi  (1982), who argue that delays should be 
compensated at the riskless rate. To the extent 
that the overnight federal funds rate is riskless, 
the coefficient should be one if Iakonishok and 
Levi are correct. The results in table 4 are, how- 
ever, consistent with their empirical results. 
Iakonishok and Levi assume that settlement and 
check-clearing delays are priced at the prime rate 
and test to see if  the prime rate is large enough 
to explain the weekend effect. Although a strict 
interpretation of their story requires that sellers 
be compensated at the riskless rate, they report 
that the prime rate is too low to eliminate these 
effects completely. This suggests that if  the set- 
tlement and check-clearing delays were in fact 
the sole reason for the weekly pattern, rates of 
compensation during these delays must be 
larger than the riskless rate. Since our results 
apply only to the settlement delay and not to the 
check-clearing delay, they do  not directly relate 
to those of Iakonishok and Levi. However, they 
do  suggest the possibility that rates of compensa- 
tion are larger than the riskless rate. 
Conceivably, though, the rate of compensation 
should not be the riskless rate: errors in posting 
to brokerage or bank accounts do  occur. While 
restitution is always made if the error is caught, 
the seller may not notice it. Even if  he does, 
complaining is time-consuming. The seller may 
therefore require a premium over the riskless 
rate. In addition, the buyer may very well be wil- 
ling to pay this premium. If  he monitors his 
account, it cannot be debited early, but through 
bank or brokerage error, it may be debited late. 
Since the buyer can only win, he is willing to pay 
extra for this possibility. 
Using the brokers' call money rate as the 
interest rate proxy would probably produce 
smaller values of  b ;.  This rate tends to be higher 
than the federal funds rate, so smaller propor- 
tions of the call money rate imply the same lev- 
els of compensation. If  the call money rate is as 
variable as the federal funds rate, t -tests would 
be less likely to reject the notion that the rate of 
compensation is the call money rate. 
a. Significant at  the 10 percent level. 
b. Significant at  the 1 percent level. 
c. Significant at the 5 percent level. 
NOTE: Significance levels are  for one-tailed tests on 6; and b;. 
SOURCE: Author's computations. - 
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This paper shows that investors consider delivery 
procedures in pricing stocks. We model stock 
returns in two ways. The first uses a function of 
the length of the settlement delay, while the 
second uses a function of both the length of the 
delay and interest rates during the delay. We find 
that the coefficient on this variable is always cor- 
rectly signed and statistically significant.  This 
means that observed prices diverge from the 
prices that would be observed in the absence of 
this trading mechanism. This, in turn, means that 
measured returns diverge from true returns. 
While this result is comforting to researchers 
who have assumed that settlement delays are 
priced, it does have implications for empirical 
studies using daily stock-return data. Since the 
observed price equals the true price plus a pre- 
mium to compensate for financing costs, meas- 
ured returns diverge from true returns if  the pre- 
mium changes during the holding period. This 
could, for example, affect event studies either by 
masking the impact of a true economic event or 
by lending statistical significance to "events" 
which result only from changes in the premium 
and not from any underlying economic force. 
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Structure and 
Profitability 
on Firm Openings 
by Paul W. Bauer 
and Brian A. Cromwell 
Introduction 
The banking industry has undergone significant 
changes in recent years. Much attention has been 
given to the effect of financial deregulation and 
interstate banking on the structure of the bank- 
ing industry. Attention has also been directed at 
the systematic effects of financial structure on the 
national economy. 
However, bank structure can also affect local 
economic development.'  The availability and 
the cost of financing potentially varies across 
regions due to differences in bank structure and 
in the health of the local banking sector. Since 
bank credit is an important source of financing 
for new firms, differences in bank structure can 
affect regional growth. 
This paper examines the effects of bank struc- 
ture and profitability on the birth of new firms, 
an important component of economic develop- 
ment. Specifically, we enter measures of profita- 
W  1  We use the term "bank structure" to refer to both the organization of 
banks themselves (number of branches, employees per bank, etc.) and the 
market structure of  the banking sector (concentration, ease of  entry, etc.). 
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rine Samolyk, James Thomson, Gary 
Whalen, and David Whitehead for 
useful discussion and suggestions. 
Ralph Day and Lynn Downey pro- 
vided valuable assistance with the 
data and systems. Fadi Alameddine 
and Kristin Srnalley provided excel- 
lent research assistance. 
bility, concentration, size, and entry of a region's 
banking sector (as well as an overall measure of 
lending activity) into a standard model of firm 
location. This enables us to test for independent 
effects of bank structure and profitability on re- 
gional growth, as measured by business openings. 
Our results suggest that bank structure and 
profitability have significant effects on firm open- 
ings. A profitable and competitive banking mar- 
ket is associated with a higher rate of firm births. 
In particular, firm births are found to be  asso- 
ciated with higher bank profits, higher numbers 
of bank employees, lower levels of concentration, 
higher proportions of small banks, and freer 
entry of new banks into the region. These results 
support the position that bank structure and 
profitability influence economic development. 
Section I briefly reviews previous work relat- 
ing banking and economic activity and discusses 
the implications of bank structure for regional 
growth. Section I1 presents a standard model of 
firm location and extends it to include measures 
of bank structure and profitability. Section I11 
describes the data, and section IV provides 
results on the impact of banking on firm loca- 
tion. Finally, section V presents conclusions. 
http://clevelandfed.org/research/review/
1989 Q 4
Best available copyI.  Bank Structure 
and Regional Growth 
With the advent of deregulation and interstate 
banking, the banking industry has changed sig- 
nificantly in recent years. Much attention has 
been given to the effects of these developments 
on the structure of the banking industry itself.* 
Attention has also been directed at the systematic 
effects of bank failures and financial structure on 
aggregate economic a~tivity.~  The effect of 
changes in bank structure on regional econo- 
mies, however, remains an open question? 
For example, Eisenbeis (1985), in a recent 
article on interstate banking, comments that: 
The  most  controversial issues surrounding  considera- 
tion  of modifying  interstate banking  laws deal with 
the  implications of proposed  changes for  competi- 
tion  and  concentration of resources. There  is  little 
doubt that  restrictions on geographic expansion 
have, in the  past, insulated many  local markets from 
competition  and  have  restricted economic  growth. 
While  casual inspection of the data suggest that states 
with more  liberalized policies toward  intrastate bank- 
ing have  generally had  higher economic  growth  rates 
than unit banking  states, empirical studies show  no 
convincing  relationship between  banking  structure 
and  economic  development. More  detailed study 
would  have to be  done  to  determine  whether this is 
just a matter  of  correlation or causation. (p. 231-32) 
2  For example, Lee and Schweitzer (1989) use event-study analysis to 
determine the effect on stock prices of  decisions by bank holding companies 
(BHCs) to establish subsidiaries within Delaware and find no  evidence of long- 
term stock price changes during the postannouncement period. Trifts and Scan- 
Ion (1987) use a sample of  interstate mergers to provide early evidence of  the 
effects of interstate bank mergers on  shareholder wealth. Bom, Eisenbeis, and 
Hanis (1988) provide evidence on the market evaluation of financial firms 
entering into interstate banking when restrictions are relaxed and find no  signif- 
icant effect of an announced geographic interstate expansion on shareholder 
values. 
3  Gertler (1988) provides an overall review. Bemanke (1983) argues that 
extensive bank runs and defaults in the 1930-1933 financial crisis reduced the 
efficiency of  the financial sector in performing its intermediation function, caus- 
ing adverse effects on  real output, other than through monetary channels. 
Samolyk (1988) conducts a similar test on British data, using corporate and 
noncorporate insolvencies as proxies for the health of the financial sector, and 
also finds that credit factors matter empirically on output. Gilbert and Kochin 
(1990, forthcoming) provide additional tests of  the hypothesis that bank fail- 
ures have adverse effects on economic activity using rural county-level data 
and find that closing banks has adverse effects on local sales and nonagricul- 
tural employment. 
4  As discussed in Gertler (1988), the literature on financial structure and 
economic development has principally focused on variations across countries. 
Gurley and Shaw (1955) emphasize the role of  intermediaries in the credit 
supply process. They note that in developed countries there typically exists a 
highly organized system of  financial intermediation facilitating the flow of  funds 
We approach this issue by studying the effect of 
bank structure on business openings. If  bank 
structure and the health of the local banking sec- 
tor affect the cost and availability of credit for 
new firms, changes in bank structure will poten- 
tially affect regional growth. 
Financial institutions, especially banks, are the 
primary supplier of external funds to new busi- 
nesses, which are typically small, independent 
enterprises. Unlike medium-sized (100 to 500 
employees) or large corporations, small busi- 
nesses have limited access to organized open 
markets for stocks, bonds, and commercial paper. 
Approximately three of every four existing small 
businesses have borrowed from banks.5 
The availability of credit at affordable rates for 
the start-up and the continued operation of new 
firms is not necessarily a given.6 For small start- 
up firms (typically "mom and pop" operations), 
financing comes mostly from private sources, 
such as personal savings, home equity loans, and 
loans from friends or relatives. For larger small 
businesses, capital for start-ups comes from 
financial institutions and organized venture capi- 
tal firms, as well as from friends, relatives, and 
informal investors. Even after being established, 
firms may require financing when cash inflow 
lags behind cash outflow due to a rise in receiv- 
ables or an inventory buildup. 
When external financing is used, it is received 
primarily from commercial banks. The rates 
charged for small start-up firms are typically 2 to 
3 percentage points above that charged for larger 
firms. This is due in part to the high-risk nature 
of new small businesses, which lack collateral 
and a credit history and suffer high rates of 
failure. 
Some researchers and many policymakers  argue 
that banks do not meet the needs of various 
types of businesses, particularly small businesses. 
They contend that due to high monitoring costs 
and a lack of adequate information about risk, a 
market failure exists-popularly referred to as 
the "credit gap." It has been argued that the 
price of credit, especially working capital, pro- 
vided to small and middle-sized firms is too high 
after controlling for appropriate risk factors. The 
between savers and investors. They argue that the role intermediaries play in 
improving the efficiency of  intertemporal trade is an important factor governing 
general economic activity. The correlation between economic development and 
financial sophistication across time and across countries has often been noted. 
See  Goldsmith (1969) and Cameron (1972) for examples of  such studies. 
5  Small Business Administration (1985), p. 206. 
6  Current information is not available on the sources of  internal financing 
to small firms. For  historical data, see Small Business Administration (1984). 
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during which banks ration funds, with larger 
firms receiving a disproportionately large share. 
This perception of market failure is reflected 
in how public-sector development agencies 
lower the cost of credit by providing access to 
sheltered pools of money (such as public pen- 
sion funds), by passing on the favorable tax 
treatment of funds (through tax abatement and 
public bonds), or by accepting risks greater than 
private institutions are willing to bear (such as 
the loan guarantee program of the Small Busi- 
ness Administration)? 
While there are no direct measures of the 
price and availability of credit for small busi- 
nesses across regions, they are likely to vary with 
bank structure.8 Concentrated banking markets 
with large banks and high barriers to entry may 
be unresponsive to the credit needs of small 
businesses and new firms. Lending to new firms 
entails higher risks than lending to established 
firms, since a large proportion of new firms fail 
in the first few years. 
Heggestad (  l979), Rhoades and Rutz (1982 ), 
Clark (1986), and Liang (1987) argue that banks 
in highly concentrated markets trade potential 
monopoly profits for lower risk. Alternatively,  a 
highly competitive bank market, characterized by 
large numbers of smaller banks and easy entry, 
may result in a greater availability of credit at 
lower prices for small businesses. Finally, a prof- 
itable banking sector is expected to result in less 
credit rationing and a greater supply of credit for 
small firms. Even if  most start-ups do not rely 
directly upon commercial banks for their initial 
financing, the expectation of ample credit for 
future expansion at low cost potentially affects 
the decisions of entrepreneurs to start a firm.9 
An understanding of the impact of bank struc- 
ture on firm location and regional growth is 
important because of the significant changes 
occurring due to deregulation and interstate 
banking. By  the end of 1988, all but three states 
7  See  Hill and Shelley (1990,  forthcoming). 
w  8  This would not be  true if banks were perfectly contestable; the actual 
number and size distribution of  competitors would not affect the price or  the 
availability of credit. Whalen (1988) found that there is evidence that bank per- 
formance is systematically  related to proxies designed to measure the inten- 
sity of actual and potential competition in rural banking markets in Ohio and 
concludes that these non-SMSA banking markets are contestable, since 
potential competition matters, but are not perfectly contestable. Our  results 
suggest  this may be  true for  SMSAs as well. 
w  9  Unfortunately, we do not have measures of  sources of  funds from non- 
bank entities, which potentially compete with commercial banks. 
permitted some form of interstate acquisition of 
their banks, 14,600 ofices of banking organiza- 
tions existed outside the organizations' home 
state, and more than half of these were permit- 
ted to offer all banking services.1° To the extent 
that this results in freer entry and increased 
competition among banks, the availability of cap- 
ital for small businesses and new firms could 
increase. In the Southeast and New England, 
however, these developments have increased the 
number of extremely large banks, called "super- 
regionals," at the expense of regional banks. 
Increased concentration could reduce the supply 
of credit for small businesses. 
A recent survey of state bank regulators by Hill 
and Thompson (1988) found that advancing eco- 
nomic development is an important goal of state 
bank regulators." If changes in bank structure do 
indeed affect regional growth, however, policy- 
makers may be misjudging the costs and benefits 
of deregulation and interstate banking. We now 
turn to an empirical analysis of this issue. 
II.  A Model 
of  Firm Location 
To study the effect of bank structure and profita- 
bility on local econo~nic  activity, we concentrate 
on firm openings because they are driven by 
current and expected economic conditions, as 
opposed to expansions, contractions, and deaths, 
which will be greatly affected by the large fixed 
costs associated with changing locations. The 
model estimated here was originally developed 
by Carlton (  1979), though we more closely fol- 
low Eberts and Stone (1987).12 
The number of new establishments in a city is 
assumed to depend on the number of potential 
entrepreneurs in the city and on the probability 
that a given entrepreneur will start a new firm. 
The higher the level of economic activity in a 
city, the greater the nu~nber  of potential entre- 
preneurs. Also, the higher the expected profita- 
bility of new firms, the larger the probability that 
they will actually emerge. 
w  10  These figures come from a recent comprehensive review of interstate 
banking by King et al. (1989).  Earlier surveys include Whitehead (1983a, 
1983b, and  1985), and Amel and Keane (1986). 
w  11  It ranked third, just behind ensuring the safety and soundness of  de- 
positors' funds and providing banking (depositoly) services throughout their 
states. 
w  12  For reviews of  the firm-location literature, see  Bartik (1985,  1988), 
Wasylenko (1988), and Wolkoff (1989). 
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Poisson probabilistic model, since the birth of 
new establishments is a discrete event. Let pi be 
the probability that a potential entrepreneur will 
start an establishment in a given city; then let 
where xi is a vector of independent variables 
affecting firm profitability, b is a vector of fixed 
coefficients, ei  is an error term composed of the 
variance of the Poisson process and a random 
error, and M is the number of cities in the sam- 
ple. Consistent estimates of the mean and var- 
iance of p, are given by 
(3)  Var (pi)  = (N,/BP,?), 
where Ni  is the observed number of births and 
Bpi is the birth potential as proxied by employ- 
ment in the standard metropolitan statistical area 
(SMSA).13 Carlton shows that a consistent and 
asymptotically efficient estimate of b can be 
obtained by weighted least squares, with weights 
equal to the standard error of the Poisson process. 
The independent variables typically used to 
measure expected profitability include wage 
rates, tax rates, unionization rates, and energy 
prices. We extend this list by including measures 
of bank structure and profitability.  As discussed 
in the previous section, these measures deter- 
mine, at least in part, the price and availability of 
credit and thus expected profitability and firm 
openings. Measures of bank structure and profit- 
ability are employed because direct measures of 
the price and the availability of credit are 
unavailable. To control for the effects of bank 
structure and the availability of credit on firm 
births, we include measures of the number and 
size distribution of banks as well as a measure of 
the financial health of banks. 
Data from 259 SMSAs across the country are 
employed to estimate the model. The dependent 
variable (BIRTHRATE) is the natural log of the 
ratio of new firm births (as reported for the years 
13  Although policymakers concerned with economic development value 
the employment resulting from new firms, the fimi location literature explicitly 
models the birth of the fin  itself. Using job creation (instead of firm births) as 
the dependent variable, however, yielded similar results. 
1980 to 1982 in the USELM data) to existing 
employment in the SMSA.14  A birth is defined as 
an establishment that did not exist in 1980 but 
did exist in 1982. Births within this two-year 
period are treated as comparable. 
We divide the independent variables into two 
types. The first are measures of local economic 
conditions, and the second are measures of bank 
structure and profitability. All data are measured 
at the SMSA level unless otherwise noted. 
The measures of local economic activity are the 
natural logs of the wage rate (  WAGE), the num- 
ber of establishments (FIRMS), the gross state 
product (GSP),  the personal income (PINC), 
and the population (POP).  Also included is the 
effective state corporate tax rate (  TAX).l5 We 
control for population by entering it directly into 
our equation rather than using per capita varia- 
bles that would impose additional structure. 
Bank data are obtained from the Federal 
Financial Institutions Examination Council's 
Reports on Condition and Income, known as call 
reports, for 1980. (We assume that the lagged 
1980 variables on banking are exogenous to firm 
births occurring between 1980 and 1982.) Meas- 
ures of bank structure and profitability are 
created by aggregating data from individual 
banks up to the SMSA level. The total amount of 
loans and leases (LOANS) is a measure of the 
level of bank intermediation. The average rate of 
return (RETURN), net income divided by assets, 
measures the amount of resources available for 
future lending and the health of the banking sec- 
tor.IG  This variable may also be measuring the 
effects of bank structure and the general eco- 
nomic health of the region. The empirical analy- 
sis will thus explicitly control for these effects. 
We employ standard measures of market struc- 
ture such as the total number of banks (HQS) 
and branches (BRANCH), the number of bank 
employees per bank (BANKEMP),  and a Herfin- 
dahl index of the concentration of deposits 
(HERF).17 We also include a measure of bank 
w  14  USELM stands for the  U.S. Establishment and Longitudinal Microdata 
file constructed for the Small Business Administration by Dun and Bradstreet. 
15  WAGE  and TAX  are 1977 variables from the Census of Manufactures. 
GSP, PINC,  and POP  are 1980 variables from the Census Bureau and the 
Department of Commerce. The number of  establishments is a 1980 variable 
from the USELM data. 
w  16  Specifications using income divided by equity capital yield similar 
results. 
17  The  Herfindahl index is defined as the sum of the square of each 
bank's share of  deposits for a given SMSA. While we are interested in the 
effect of concentration in the lending marhet, we assume  that deposits are 
subject to less geographic dispersion than loans, and thus provide a more 
accurate indicator of concentration in the local banking sector. 
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Variable  Mean 
BIRTHRATE (firm  0.008 
birth/employment) 
WAGE (manufacturing)  5.986 
TAX  (effective tax rate)  0.403 
FIRMS  (number of  13,150 
establishments) 
POP (population,  635.4 
thousands) 
LOANS  (total loans  2,656.4 
and leases, millions) 
RETURN  0.009 
(net income/assets) 
HQS  (number of banks)  23 
BRANCHES  132 
(number of branches) 
BANKEMP  196.8 
(employees/bank) 
HERF  (Herfindahl  2,499 
concentration index) 
SIZE 1 (percent of  banks  0.456 
with $0-$25 million assets) 
SIZE 2 (percent of banks  0.180 
with $25-$50 million assets) 
SIZE 3 (percent of  banks  0.084 
with $50-$75 million assets) 
SIZE 4 (percent of  banks  0.058 
with $75-$100 million assets) 
SIZE 5 (percent of banks  0.042 
with $100-$250 million assets) 
SIZE 6 (percent of  banks  0.028 
with $250-$400 million assets) 
ENTRY (percentage change  -0.014 
in the number of banks) 
PINC  (personal  6,740.4 
income, millions) 
GSP  (gross state  100,680 
product, millions) 
NOTE: Changes are measured as log  differences. 
SOURCE: Authors' calculations. 
Standard 
Deviation 
entry (ENTRY ), the percentage net change in 
the number of banks from 1978 to 1980.l8 
Our last measures of bank structure are a set 
of variables (SIZE I-SIZE 6) that control for the 
size of banks. SIZE I is the proportion of banks 
in an SMSA  with assets less than $25 million, 
SIZE 2 is the proportion of banks with assets 
between $25 and $50 million, SIZE 3 is the pro- 
portion of banks .with assets between $50 and 
$75 million, SIZE 4 is the proportion of banks 
with assets between $75 and $100 million, SIZE 5 
is the proportion of banks with assets between 
$100 and $250 million, and SIZE 6 is the propor- 
tion of banks with assets of $250 to $400 million. 
The proportion of banks with assets greater than 
$400 million is the omitted category in our esti- 
mations.I9 Summary statistics for these variables 
are presented in table 1. 
A pervasive problem with this data set for the 
purpose of looking at how banking activity 
affects the regional economy is that regions for 
which data are collected (SMSAs and states) and 
economic regions do  not necessarily match. In 
addition, for some variables, such as LOANS, 
though the total dollar value of loans is known, 
it is not possible to determine where the loans 
were made. For example, loans made by an 
Ohio bank to firms in Florida and Ohio are 
counted in the same way. 
With the banking data, there is an additional 
measurement problem in that a call report for a 
consolidated banking unit may include data for 
branches not located in the SMSA.  In states that 
allow branch banking, activity at the branches 
may be reported solely in the SMSA  headquarters. 
Thus, our measures of competition and concen- 
tration are potentially subject to errors. The sen- 
sitivity of our full sample results to this potential 
errors-in-variables problem is tested by running 
the model without SMSAs in states that have state- 
wide branching, and then again without SMSAs 
in states that have limited branching (that is, 
only SMSAs  in unit banking states). 
IV.  Estimation and Results 
Full Sample  Results 
Estimates of variations of the above model for 
the full sample are presented in table 2. Equa. 
18  Note that this measure treats entry and exit symmetrically. 
19  Alternative measures of size were also tested. In general, only the 
measures of the smaller banks were statistically significant. 
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Estimation Results 
Coefficient  (1)  (2)  (3) 
WAGE  -0.6823"  -0.4426"  -0.5076" 
(0.1131)  (0.1023)  (0.1140) 
TAX  -  1  ,8368"  -  1  ,7032"  -1.5193" 
(0.5694)  (0.5442)  (0.5490) 
FIRMS  0.2825"  0.3453"  0.3046" 
(0.0940)  (0.0939)  (0.1090) 
POP  -0.2412"  -0.1694~  -0.3532" 
(0.1015)  (0.1002)  (0.1692) 
LOANS  -  -0.0393  -0.0602 
(0.0870)  (0.0872) 
RETURN  -  3  1  ,7890"  31.2940" 
(6.8238)  (6.8055) 
BRANCHES  -  -0.2271"  -0.1945" 
(0.0555)  (0.0574) 
BANKEMP  -  0.3192"  0.3191" 
(0.0942)  (0.0938) 
HERF  -  -0.  1987"  -0.1911a 
(0.0687)  (0.0684) 
SIZE 1  -  0.8650"  0.8550" 
(0.2463)  (0.2450) 
SIZE 2  -  0.3396  0.3168 
(0.2537)  (0.2525) 
SIZE 3  -  0.4889~  0.4486 
(0.2746)  (0.2742) 
SIZE 4  -  0.4387  0.4101 
(0.2688)  (0.2677) 
SIZE 5 
SIZE 6 
ENTRY  -  0.4314"  0.4239" 
(0.1319)  (0.1312) 
GSP  -  -  0.0427~ 
(0.0239) 
CONSTANT  -4.0502a  -4.6572"  -6.3725" 
(0.4267)  (0.7856)  ( 1.5336) 
Log  likelihood 
function  -95.4467  -46.6358  -44.1093 
R-square  0.2109  0.4579  0.4683 
Mean of  the dependent 
variable  -4.9267  -4.9267  -4.9267 
No. of obs.  259  259  259 
a. Significant at the 95 percent confidence level. 
b. Significant at the 90 percent confidence level. 
NOTE: Standard errors of the coefficients appear in parentheses. 
SOURCE:  Authors' calculations. 
where the probability that a birth will occur 
depends on the wages, taxes, number of estab- 
lishments, and population. This set of variables 
differs somewhat from that employed by Carlton 
(1979), who also used the unionization rate and 
energy prices in his estimates for selected indus- 
tries. Eberts and Stone (1987) found that energy 
prices do not matter when the model is esti- 
mated with aggregate manufacturing data, and it 
is even less likely that energy prices would mat- 
ter since we are looking at all industries. 
Because we are not concerned about differ- 
ences across industries and are interested only in 
whether there are statistically significant effects 
on aggregate regional economic activity as a 
result of bank structure and profitability, energy 
prices can safely be omitted. The unionization 
rate was omitted due to lack of available data. 
We assume that unionization is not systemati- 
cally related to the banking variables. 
All the coefficients in equation (1) are statisti- 
cally significant at the 95 percent confidence 
level. As expected, we find that higher wages 
and higher effective corporate tax rates reduce 
the probability of firm births in an SMSA.  Also, 
the probability of firm births increases with a 
greater number of establishments (FIRMS)  and a 
lower population. Though the coefficient on 
population is somewhat unexpected, this result 
suggests that given the similar magnitude and 
opposite signs of these two coefficients, perhaps 
the number of firms per capita is the appropriate 
regressor. We continue entering population as a 
separate regressor because this is the most gen- 
eral way of including population in the m0del.~0 
Equation (2) estimates the same model, only 
now the measures of bank structure and profita- 
bility are included. The results strongly support 
the view that bank structure and profitability 
have a statistically significant effect on firm 
births. The addition of the bank structure varia- 
bles did not affect the estimates of the basic firm 
location variables. The basic firm location coefi- 
cients have roughly the same magnitude and 
remain statistically significant at the 90 percent 
confidence level or higher. 
The measure of the total amount of financial 
intermediation (LOANS) is negative but not sta- 
tistically significant. The RETUTW  variable has a 
positive and statistically significant coefficient, 




Best available copysuggesting that (controlling for structure) a prof- 
Unit and Limited Branching States 
Coefficient  (1  (2) 
WAGE  -0.7558a  -0.4559a 
(0.1137)  (0.1075) 
TAX  -3.0484a  -  1 .5043a 
(0.6175)  (0.6943) 
FIRMS  0.4437a  0.4013a 
(0.1132)  (0.1392) 
POP  -0.4337a  -0.300Ia 
(0.1224)  (0.1367) 
LOANS  -  -0.1162 
-  (0.1352) 
RETURN  -  44.3430a 
(9.9812) 
BRANCHES  -  -0.2778a 
-  (0.0735) 
BANKEMP  -  0.5493a 








ENTRY  -  0.1757  0.1948 
-  (0.2295)  (0.231  1) 
PINC  -  -  0.0108 
-  -  (0.2472) 
GSP  -  -  0.0661 
-  -  (0.0372) 
CONSTANT  -3.7568a  -5.1642a  -5.9276a 
(0.4690)  (1.0234)  (  1.9894) 
Log likelihood 
function  -53.0456  -19.2143  -17.4198 
R-square  0.3675  0.5569  0.5652 
Mean of the dependent 
variable  -4.9699  -4.9699  -4.9699 
No. of obs.  190  190  190 
a. Significant at the 95 percent confidence level. 
b.  Significant at the 90 percent confidence level. 
NOTE: Standard errors of the coefficients appear in parentheses. 
SOURCE: Authors' calculations. 
itable banking sector is associated with a higher 
probability of firm births. Profitable banks could 
have more opportunities for providing interme- 
diation services and engage in less credit ration- 
ing, suggesting a positive relationship with firm 
births. Alternatively, high profits in the banking 
sector could merely be indicating profitable 
market conditions for other industries as well. 
(We will therefore control for regional economic 
activity in equation [3]  . ) 
The number of banks (HQS) is not statistically 
significant, but BRANCHES, BANKEMP,  and 
HERF are, suggesting that the greater the 
number of branches and the more concentrated 
the banking market (at least as measured by 
HERF), the lower the probability of firm births. 
More branches could reflect more of a retail 
orientation of the banks. Also, the more 
employees per bank, the higher the probability 
of firm births. 
The statistical significance and the magnitude 
of SIZE 1 suggest that smaller banks (those with 
less than $5 million in assets) are more involved 
in firm births than larger banks: the higher the 
proportion of small banks, the higher the proba- 
bility of firm births. Finally, the coefficient on 
ENTRY is positive and statistically significant, 
implying that the more contestable the banking 
market (as indicated by a larger value for entry), 
the higher the probability of firm births. 
In equation (3), two more measures of 
regional activity (PINC and GSP) are added to 
the model to see whether the bank structure and 
profitability effects are merely reflecting regional 
economic conditions. Of the added regressors, 
only GSP is statistically significant and only at 
the 90 percent confidence level. The bank- 
related coefficient estimates do not change 
appreciably with the addition of these regressors. 
In particular, KETUW retains its positive and sta- 
tistically significant value even when we control 
as much as possible for local economic condi- 
tions, suggesting that this variable is doing more 
than just reflecting a robust local economy.21 
Partial Sample Results 
As  previously discussed, the banking data are 
potentially subject to significant measurement 
21  Specifications that included the complete set of  economic variables 
but entered the various bank structure variables separately (instead of the full 
set) yielded similar results. An exception was our  measure of  concentration, 
HERE  which was statistically significant only when the  SlZE  variables were 
included as well. 
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Best available copyUnit Banking States 
Coefficient  (1)  (2)  (3) 
WAGE  -0.8847a  -0.5494a  -0.3466a 
(0.1994)  (0.1951)  (0.2724) 
TAX  -1.6874  -0.2816  -0.9859 
(1.0677)  (0.9922)  (1.7693) 
FIRMS  0.5193a  0.3525  0.5890~ 
(0.1778)  (0.2747)  (0.3543) 
POP  0.5029a  0.0184  0.2364 
(0.1885)  (0.2915)  (0.3563) 
LOANS 
RETURN  -  36.6800~  43.8810~ 
(22.1410)  (23.4160) 
BRANCHES  -  -0.3807~  -0.4427~ 
-  (0.2136)  (0.2367) 
BANKEMP  -  0.0810~  0.1937 











CONSTANT  ~i.2875~  -10.0850a  -5.8005 
(0.6673)  (2.8175)  (4.9151) 
Log likelihood 
knction  -13.6582  12.8326  13.7363 
R-Square  0.4021  0.7603  0.7677 
Mean of  the dependent 
variable  -4.7987  -4.7994  -4.7993 
No. of obs.  58  58  58 
a. Significant at the 95 percent confidence le\lel. 
b. Significant at the 90 percent confidence level. 
NOTE: Standard errors of the coefficients appear in parentheses. 
SOURCE:  Authors' calculations. 
error. In states that permit statewide branching, a 
call report for a consolidated banking unit may 
include data for branches not located in the 
SMSA. While the standard errors-in-variables 
problem in econometrics results in a bias toward 
zero in the estimated coeficients, we wanted to 
test whether our results were due to measure- 
ment error. We therefore estimate the model 
without SMSAs  in states that have statewide 
branch banking, and then again without SMSAs 
in states that allow statewide or limited branch- 
ing. These results are reported in tables 3 and 4. 
In table 3, we reestimate the model omitting 
SMSAs  in states with statewide branching.22 
Although the magnitude of the coefficients tends 
to be larger, there is no qualitative change in the 
results in equation (1). In equation (2), the 
results are again quite similar to those in table 1, 
except that more of the size variables are statisti- 
cally significant, but ENTRY is no longer statisti- 
cally significant. These differences carry over to 
the results for equation (3). Thus, omitting the 
SMSAs in the statewide branching states has little 
effect on our results. 
Though we remove most of the measurement 
problems in the banking variables by omitting 
the SMSAs  in the statewide branching states, the 
same problems hold to a much lesser degree for 
the SMSAs  in the states with limited branching, 
which generally allow branches to operate only 
in contiguous counties. 
In table 4, the model is reestimated with only 
the SMSAs  in the unit banking ~tates.~3  These sta- 
tistical results are not as strong, but our sample 
has fallen from 259 in table 2, to 190 in table 3, 
to only 58 in table 4. Of the bank structure and 
profitability variables (reported in equation [2]  ), 
RETURN, BRANCHES, SIZE 1, SIZE 3, and SIZE 5 
all remain statistically significant. BANKEMP and 
HERF  lose their statistical significance, but 
ENTRY once again becomes statistically signifi- 
cant. When we add PINC and GSP in equation 
(3), WAGE is no longer statistically significant, 
but the number of establishments (FIRMS) is. Of 
the banking variables, RETURNS, BRANCHES, 
22  Thus,  we omit SMSAs in the following states: Alaska, Arizona, Cali- 
fornia, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Maine, Maryland, Nev- 
ada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Oregon, Rhode 
Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, and 
Washington. 
23  Thus, only SMSAs in the following states are included in this sample: 
Colorado, Illinois, Kansas,  Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, North Dakota, Okla- 
homa, Texas, West Virginia, and Wyoming. 
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Best available copySIZE 1, SIZE 3, and ENTRY all remain statistically 
significant. In the basic firm-location model 
(equation [I]  ), the coefficients retain the same 
signs and magnitudes, though the state corporate 
tax rate (  TAX) is no longer statistically signifi- 
cant. When we add the bank variables, only 
WAGE  retains its statistical significance. 
Clearly, the model does not perform as well 
with this sample. Even the coefficients in the 
basic firm location model lose their statistical 
significance (except for FIRMS). Whether this is 
due to the small sample size or to possibly pecu- 
liar characteristics of the included SMSAs  is 
unclear.z4 Yet even with this sample, bank struc- 
ture (as measured by RETW  BRANCHES, 
SIZE 1, SIZE 3, and ENTRY) retains a statistically 
significant effect on firm births. 
In summary, the error-in-variables problem 
discussed in the previous section does not 
appear to severely bias our results. Estimates of 
the model using the full sample are very similar 
to the estimates obtained using only SMSAs  in 
states with unit or limited branching. When the 
model is estimated with just the SMSAs  in unit 
branch banking states, the estimates change 
much more, but the profitability of the banking 
sector, the number of branches, the proportion 
of small banks, and entry all have a statistically 
significant effect on the probability of firm bids 
Our measure of concentration (HERF) retains 
the same sign and magnitude but is not statisti- 
cally significant. Banking structure and the avail- 
ability of credit appear to have measurable 
effects on firm births. 
V.  Conclusion 
This study presents evidence on the effects of 
bank structure and profitability on the births of 
new firms. The attraction of new firms is an 
important goal of local economic development 
policies, which often provide public-sector 
financial incentives. Private-sector financial struc- 
ture, however, potentially influences firm loca- 
tion through the price and availability of credit 
from commercial banks. 
The empirical analysis examines the relation- 
ship between banking activity and regional 
development from 1980 through 1982. Using 
bank-level data, we construct measures of lend- 
ing, profitability, concentration, size, and entry in 
the banking sectors of 259 SMSAs. Measures of 
bank structure are included in a standard model 
of firm location in order to test for independent 
effects of banking on regional growth as meas- 
ured by firm births. 
As  with other firm location studies, we find 
firm births to be positively associated with low 
wages, low taxes, and a large number of existing 
firms. Our analysis, however, also shows that the 
private banking sector appears to be systemati- 
cally related to the probability of firm births. 
Higher rates of firm openings are associated with 
a healthy and competitive banking sector. Specif- 
ically, firm births are associated with higher rates 
of bank profits, higher numbers of bank employ- 
ees, lower levels of concentration, higher pro- 
portions of small banks, and higher rates of entry 
of new banks into the SMSA. These results are 
robust across several specifications and samples 
and support the position that bank structure and 
profitability are significant factors in facilitating 
economic development. 
W  24  The remaining SMSAs in the sample tend to be in states with large 
energy and agricultural sectors. 
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